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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that we asked you whether the average temperature in San
Francisco was higher or lower than 558 degrees. 1 Do you think this question
would influence your estimate of the average temperature in the city?
Suppose instead that we asked you whether the average price of a college
textbook was higher or lower than $7,128.53.2 Would this question havean
impact on your estimate of the average price of such a text? What if we asked
you whether the number of "top 10" Beatles' records was higher or lower
than 100,025? 3 Would this affect your estimate of the number of Beatles'
albums that did make the top 10?
You wouldn't think so, but you would probably be wrong. Due to a
phenomenon that psychologists call "anchoring," 4 we are often unduly
influenced by the initial figure we encounter when estimating the value of an
item. This initial value serves as a kind of reference point or benchmark that
anchors our expectations about the item's actual value.5
Negotiation and dispute resolution scholars have observed that this
phenomenon could have an impact on negotiation. In a number of studies,
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1 SCOTT PLous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 146 (1993)
(reporting the results of an unpublished study conducted by George Quattrone and
colleagues).
2Id.
31d.
4 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128-30 (1974) (introducing anchoring).
5 Id. at 1128 ("[D]ifferent starting points yield different estimates, which are biased
toward the initial values.").
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researchers have shown that opening offers and demands, 6 insurance policy
caps,7 statutory damage caps, 8 negotiator aspirations,9 and other "first
numbers" can influence negotiation outcomes in transactions and settlements.
What no researcher has done, however, is assess how potent this
phenomenon is.
In this article, we attempt to do just that by conducting a "meta-analysis"
of studies that have tested the impact of an opening figure in a negotiation
experiment. Meta-analysis, as we explain in greater detail below, is a
statistical method that allows scholars to analyze all available studies to
measure the impact of one variable-in this case, opening offers, demands or
other starting figures-on another variable-in this case, negotiation
outcomes. 10 Using this technique, we find that anchoring has a powerful
impact on negotiation outcomes.
We. also use meta-analytic techniques to explore whether two factors
might limit the impact of anchoring on negotiation outcomes: information
and expertise. With respect to the first, we hypothesized that an anchor
would be most influential in information-poor environments; in those
environments where the recipient of an anchor has much more information
about the value of the item being negotiated, we expected that anchors would
exert less influence. We find some-but only some-support for this
proposition. Second, we hypothesized that experienced negotiators would be
less susceptible than inexperienced negotiators to the influence of anchors.
Again, we find some-but only some-support for this proposition. On the
whole, we conclude that anchoring has a significant impact on negotiators
and negotiation outcomes.
Our article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we explore the phenomenon of
anchoring in greater detail, providing insight into its operation and
underlying etiology. In Part III, we explore the role anchoring can play in the
legal system, focusing specifically on its import in the courtroom and at the
bargaining table. In Part IV, we describe our study. We first explain meta-
6 See, e.g., Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: The
Role of Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL.
657, 660-65 (2001); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers and Out-of-
Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP.
RESOL. 1, 11-13, 18-19 (1994).
7 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Litigation Stakeholders: Repeat-Player
Resistance to Cognitive Bias? (Feb. 17, 2006) (working paper, on file with the authors).
8 See Linda Babcock & Greg Pogarsky, Damage Caps and Settlement: A Behavioral
Approach, 28 J. LEGAL STuD. 341, 361-68 (1999).
9 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
38-44 (2002).
'0 See infra Part IV.
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analysis, the statistical technique we employ in the paper. We then report our
findings, documenting the impact of anchoring in negotiation. Finally, in Part
V, we explore the implications of our analysis for negotiators, offering both
"negotiation offense" and "negotiation defense" prescriptions.
II. ANCHORING
In the 1970s, two cognitive psychologists, Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, set out to explore how people make judgments and decisions.
Using classical experimental methods, they found that we do not follow the
logical axioms oforational choice or expected utility theory when making
choices. Instead, we tend to "rely on a limited number of heuristic
principles," including anchoring," l "which reduce the complex task of
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental
operations." 12 Each of these heuristics can be quite useful; often, however,
they can "lead to severe and systematic errors." 13 This is certainly true of
anchoring.
A. Anchoring Explained
When estimating the objective or subjective value of an item--such as
the price at which we can purchase a rug, the value at which a lawsuit will
11 Initially, Tversky and Kahneman identified three basic heuristics: availability,
representativeness, and anchoring. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at 1124, 1127-
28. More recently, Kahneman and Shane Frederick have argued that the three basic
heuristics are representativeness, availability, and the affect heuristic. Daniel Kahneman
& Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive
Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 56
(Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) ("It has become evident
that an affect heuristic should replace anchoring in the list of major general-purpose
heuristics.") (citation omitted). But see Daniel T. Gilbert, Inferential Correction, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 167 (Thomas
Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) (arguing that anchoring and
adjustment "describes the process by which the human mind does virtually all of its
inferential work").
Most decision researchers use the phrase "heuristics and biases" loosely to refer to a
long list of mental shortcuts that decisionmakers are likely to employ. See, e.g.,
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra (containing
chapters describing several different phenomena); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982)
[hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY].
12 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at 1124.
13 Id.
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settle, or the damages a judge will award in a civil case-we have an
automatic, unconscious tendency to "anchor" on the first number we
encounter. 14 That is, "the number that starts the generation of a judgment
exerts a stronger impact than do subsequent pieces of numeric
information."15
In one classic illustration of anchoring, Tversky and Kahneman asked
participants to estimate the percentage of African countries in the United
Nations. 16 Before doing so, however, they spun a "wheel of fortune," which
they had rigged to stop at 10 or 65. They asked the participants, whom they
divided into two groups, whether the percentage of African countries in the
U.N. was higher or lower than the number on the wheel. When the wheel
stopped on 10, participants estimated that 25 percent of African countries
were members of the U.N.; when the wheel stopped on 65, however, the
other participants estimated that number at 45 percent.17 The arbitrary spin of
the wheel influenced the participants' estimates dramatically.
In a similar study, researchers asked two groups of auditors to estimate
the amount of management fraud in companies audited by accounting
firms.' 8 Beforehand, the researchers gave each group different anchors. The
researchers asked one group whether fraud occurred in more than 10 of every
1,000 companies and asked the other group whether fraud occurred in more
than 200 of every 1,000 companies. These anchors influenced the auditors'
estimates, as those in the former group estimated that there were 16.5
incidences of fraud, while those in the latter group estimated that there were
14 Daniel Gilbert argues that anchoring "describes the process by which the human
mind does virtually all of its inferential work." Gilbert, supra note 11, at 167. Gilbert
explains:
[Olne of psychology's fundamental insights is that judgments are generally the
product of nonconscious systems that operate quickly, on the basis of scant
evidence, and in a routine manner, and then pass their hurried approximations to
consciousness, which slowly and deliberately adjusts them. In this sense, anchoring
and adjustment is a fundamental description of mental life.
Id.
15 Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Heuristic Strategies for Estimation Under
Uncertainty: The Enigmatic Case of Anchoring, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION:
A FESTSCHRIFr IN HONOR OF ROBERT S. WYER, JR. 79, 80 (Galen V. Bodenhausen &
Alan J. Lambert eds., 2003).
16 Tversky & Kalneman, supra note 4, at 1128.
17 ld.
18 Edward J. Joyce & Gary C. Biddle, Anchoring and Adjustment in Probabilistic
Inference in Auditing, 19 J. ACCT. RES. 120, 123 (1981).
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43.1 incidences of fraud. 19 Relative to the lower anchor (10 per 1000), the
higher anchor (200 per 1000) drove estimates up by more than 250 percent.
Like all heuristics, anchoring is often adaptive.20 For example, when
estimating how much we will have to pay to purchase a house, it is usually
reasonable for us to rely on the initial list price because it often conveys
meaningful information about the actual market value of the home.2 1
Problems can arise, however, in two circumstances. First, we can get into
trouble when we over-rely on an anchor. In the home purchase example, for
instance, we are at risk of over-paying for the house if we are unable to
adjust sufficiently away from its list price. Second, we can get into trouble if
we rely on an irrelevant or uninformative anchor.22 If, for example, a
newspaper article recounting the median home price in Honolulu influences
the amount we are willing to pay for a small house in Des Moines, we are
also at risk of over-paying for that home. (Likewise, if our estimate of
African membership in the United Nations is influenced by the spin of a
wheel of fortune, anchoring is obviously influencing our judgment in
untoward ways.)
B. Why Do We Anchor?
Anchoring might be "the easiest [heuristic] to demonstrate" but "the
hardest to explain." 23 Psychologists have offered four theoretical accounts of
anchoring: (1) the social implications theory; (2) the insufficient adjustment
theory; (3) the numeric priming theory; and (4) the information salience
theory. The latter of the four provides perhaps the most compelling
explanation of anchoring, but each sheds some light on this phenomenon.
19 Id. at 122-26.
20 For more on the adaptive properties of heuristics, see generally SIMPLE
HEURIsTICs THAT MAKE US SMART (Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd & the ABC
Research Group eds., 1999).
21 But see Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real
Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 87-93 (1987) (demonstrating
that real estate agents' judgments about the market price of homes were influenced by
manipulations of the list prices).
22 Sometimes scholars define anchoring narrowly to refer solely to this
circumstance. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed
Feelings, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 296, 308 (1992)
("Anchoring effects will be explained as cases in which a stimulus or a message that is
clearly designated as irrelevant and uninformative nevertheless increases the normality of
a possible outcome.").
23 Strack & Mussweiler, supra note 15, at 80.
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1. Social Implications Theory
The social implications theory posits that anchoring is a product of social
exchange.24 On this account, anchoring influences us because we believe that
people providing us with an anchor 25 would do so only if the anchor conveys
meaningful information about the value of the item under consideration. 26 In
other words, "the fact that one is provided with such information suggests
that the true value is somewhere in the vicinity of the standard.
'27  
"1
In certain cases, the social implications theory undoubtedly has
explanatory power. Assuming we have reason to trust the party providing the
anchor, it seems plausible that we might be influenced by the anchor because
that party provided it.28 But in circumstances where there is reason to be
suspicious of the party providing the anchor-as is often the case in
negotiation-the social implications theory cannot account for its influence.
Likewise, in circumstances where an anchor is arbitrarily generated-for
example, where one party spins a wheel of fortune, lands on a seemingly
arbitrary number, and then asks the other party to estimate the percentage of
African nations in the U.N.-the social implications theory cannot account
for the resulting influence on that party's estimate.
2. Insufficient Adjustment Theory
The most commonly offered theory-which Tversky and Kalneman
appear to have embraced in their original exploration of anchoring 29-posits
that we anchor because we fail to adjust. According to psychologists
Gretchen Chapman and Eric Johnson:
Anchoring effects have most often been explained in conjunction with the
idea of insufficient adjustment away from the anchor. The name anchoring
and adjustment implies a particular cognitive process whereby
24 ld. at 81.
25 Of course, anchors can also be self-generated. See, e.g., Nicholas Epley &
Thomas Gilovich, Putting Adjustment Back in the Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic,
in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 11, at
139.
26 Strack & Mussweiler, supra note 15, at 81.
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., Karen E. Jacowitz & Daniel Kahneman, Measures of Anchoring in
Estimation Tasks, 21 PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1161, 1162 (1995) ("At least
in some experiments, the anchor can be taken as a hint from the experimenter, which
subjects clutching at straws quite reasonably use.").
29 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at 1128-30.
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decisionmakers first focus on the anchor and then make a series of dynamic
adjustments toward their final estimate. Because these adjustments are
insufficient, the final answer is biased toward the anchor.30
To say that anchoring is a product of insufficient adjustment begs the
obvious question of why we fail to adjust sufficiently in the first place. Some
scholars have argued that we fail to adjust due to uncertainty; others have
attributed it to a lack of cognitive effort. 31 These accounts are plausible in
some cases. For example, when estimating the average temperature in San
Francisco or the average price of a college text, we might fail to adjust
sufficiently due to our uncertainty about these values or our indifference to
the accuracy of our estimates. But even in instances where we have more
information about the value of an item and care about getting the answer
right, anchoring can still influence our judgment.32 Moreover, in some
experimental settings, researchers have used financial inducements to reward
subjects for accurate estimates; by and large, these incentives have not
eliminated or reduced anchoring effects.33 Finally, research shows that
anchoring can occur even where adjustment is not required. 34
3. Numeric Priming Theory
The numeric priming theory posits that anchoring influences judgment
through a simple priming process. Once we learn of a numeric anchor, that
number, regardless of its relevance to the item being evaluated, influences
our estimates. As Fritz Strack and Thomas Mussweiler explain, "if a numeric
value comes to mind, it should affect the judgment independent of the
judgmental dimension."35
Strack and Mussweiler have demonstrated that simple priming cannot
fully account for the anchoring effect. In one of their studies, they asked
participants to estimate whether Berlin's famous Brandenburg Gate was
30 Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant: Anchors
in Judgments of Belief and Value, in HEURIsTICs AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 11, at 120, 127.
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Northcraft & Neale, supra note 21, at 87-93 (showing that experts with
knowledge of the real estate market are nonetheless influenced by anchoring).
33 See, e.g., Chapman & Johnson, supra note 30, at 128 ("[E]vidence about the
effect of incentives is mixed but mostly negative. More broadly, several judgment
phenomena that are attributed to anchoring, most notably preference reversals, do not
diminish in the face of incentives.").
34 Id. at 129.
35 Strack & Mussweiler, supra note 15, at 83.
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taller or shorter than 150 meters.36 After priming participants with this
anchor, they then asked some of them to estimate the Gate's height and
others to estimate the Gate's width. They reasoned that, if anchoring is a
product of numeric priming, the effect of the anchor would be the same in
both cases. In fact, however, they found that it exerted a much more powerful
influence on subjects' estimates of height than on their estimates of width.37
They concluded that "the same anchor value may have different judgmental
consequences," demonstrating that anchoring cannot be a product of mere
numeric priming.38
4. Information Accessibility Theory
The most widely accepted account of anchoring-the information
accessibility theory-is essentially an enriched version of the numeric
priming theory. According to the information accessibility theory, a numeric
anchor contains semantic content, such as information about height, width,
dollar amount, and so forth. 39 When we are presented with an anchor, we
engage in a kind of explicit or implicit hypothesis testing of the accuracy of
the semantic content of the anchor. We begin by looking for evidence
consistent with the hypothesis; even if we can reject the hypothesis quickly,
the fact that we have momentarily treated it as potentially true causes it to
affect our judgment.40 Strack and Mussweiler use the following example to
illustrate:
[A]ssume that you are asked to decide whether the extension of the
Mississippi River is between 3000 and 35000 miles. You take this as a
hypothesis and seek information that is consistent with this possibility. You
may for instance, construct a mental map that depicts the river as it flows
from the Canadian border to the Gulf of Mexico (2350 miles). But knowing
that this distance is below 3000 miles, you reject the hypothesis. Assume, in
contrast, that the hypothesis is between 1000 and 1500 miles. While you
36 Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect:
Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437, 439-40
(1997).
37 Id. at 439-40.
38 Strack & Mussweiler, supra note 15, at 84; see also Strack & Mussweiler, supra
note 36, at 440 ("This finding of a diminishing assimilation effect for anchor values
associated with a dimension other than the target dimension cannot be accounted for by
numeric priming .... [Tihe present findings suggest that the strength of the anchoring
effect depends on how applicable the activated information is perceived to be.").
39 Strack & Mussweiler, supra note 15, at 81-83.
40 Id.
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will also reject the hypothesis, you may not think about the river in its full
extension. Thus both types of rejections have different cognitive
consequences. In the first case, information is activated that implies a big
extension of the target, while the information that is activated in the second
case implies a small extension. A subsequent assessment of length will
therefore be based on different 'subsets of cognitions' and will result in
judgments that are assimilated toward the values of the original
,hypothesis.4
1
None of these theories is altogether satisfying. Undoubtedly, each
explains, at least in part, why we are susceptible to this peculiar cognitive
phenomenon. Regardless of the underlying explanation, anchoring seems to
influence our judgment, prompting us to over or underestimate such things as
the temperature in San Francisco, the number of Beatles' records to make the
top 10, and so forth.
III. ANCHORING IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
It is not very surprising that an anchor might influence our estimates of
the temperature in a given city or the number of Beatles' hits (although the
extent of the influence remains impressive). We might not know much about
these things or care much about the accuracy of our responses (though, as
noted above, researchers have offered subjects incentives in some instances,
and they haven't had much impact4 2). If anchoring influenced judgment only
in these silly cases, it would be an interesting, but not a very important,
phenomenon. In fact, however, psychologists, legal scholars, and other
researchers have found that anchoring exerts the same kind of influence in
circumstances that matter, namely in the courtroom and at the bargaining
table.
A. Anchoring in the Courtroom
Researchers have found ample evidence that anchoring can influence
mock jurors. Several researchers have found, for instance, that the amount of
damages a plaintiff's lawyer requests for her client affects the amount of
compensatory or punitive damages that mock jurors will award in civil
cases.4 3 In one illustrative study, John Malouff and Nicolas Schutte gave
41 Id. at 82.
42 See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at 1128.
43 See, e.g., Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bomstein, The More You Ask For, the
More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNrTIVE PSYCHOL.
519, 525-28, 532-33 (1996); Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, Juror
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mock jurors information about a personal injury case in which the plaintiff
suffered a debilitating leg injury at the hands of the defendant. 44 Because the
defendant conceded liability, the only issue confronting the mock jurors was
the amount of damages to be awarded. The researchers assigned the mock
jurors to one of four conditions; in each, the participants learned that the
plaintiff's lawyer had requested a different damage amount. These requests
had a significant impact on damage awards. As Table 1 indicates, the more
the plaintiff's lawyer requested, the more the mock jurors awarded, even
though all of the mock jurors received exactly the same set of facts about the
,plaintiff's injury:45
Table 1-Malouff & Schutte Results
Damage Request Mean Award
$100,000 $90,333
$300,000 $188,462
$500,000 $282,868
$700,000 $421,538
Researchers have also found that statutory damage caps-ironically, a
tool policymakers employ to produce more rational damage awards--can
anchor juror's awards. In one experiment, for instance, Jennifer Robbennolt
and Christina Studebaker presented mock jurors with a case involving a
plaintiff who had developed HIV through a blood transfusion. 46 The mock
jurors learned that the plaintiff had filed suit against the company that had
Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiffs Requests and Plaintiffs Identity on
Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 445, 463-65 (1999); Verlin B. Hinsz
& Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial,
25 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 991, 1009-10, 1016 (1995); John Malouff & Nicola S.
Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects of Requesting Different Damage Amounts in
Personal Injury Trials, 129 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 491, 495 (1989); Allan Raitz, Edith Greene,
Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Determining Damages: The Influence of Expert
Testimony on Jurors' Decision Making, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385, 390-94 (1990);
see also VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 80 (1986) (reporting an
experiment in which a mock jury appeared susceptible to a damage amount suggested by
an attorney).
44 Malouff & Schutte, supra note 43, at 493.
45 Id. at 495.
46 See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the
Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 353, 357
(1999).
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provided the HIV-infected blood on the grounds that it had engaged in
outrageous and irresponsible testing practices. The researchers asked the
mock jurors to indicate the dollar amount they would award the plaintiff in
both compensatory and punitive damages. Unbeknownst to the mock jurors,
though, the researchers assigned them to different groups, each of which was
told that the jurisdiction imposed a different statutory damage cap on punitive
damages ($100,000, $5 million, and $50 million, respectively). The mock
jurors anchored on these damage caps. As Table 2 indicates, the punitive
damage caps influenced both compensatory and punitive damage awards:
47
Table 2-Robbennolt & Studebaker Results
Punitive Cap Mean Compensatory Award Mean Punitive Award Total Award
$100,000 $1,435,000 $83,100 $1,518,100
$5 million $2,133,750 $2,991,935 $5,125,685
$50 million $7,642,417 $15 million $22,642,417
Like jurors, judges also appear to be susceptible to anchoring. In one
study, Andrew Wistrich, Chris Guthrie, and Jeffrey Rachlinski presented trial
judges with a lengthy vignette describing a civil case in which a plaintiff had
suffered several injuries in a car accident caused by a negligent truck
driver.48 The truck driver's company admitted fault but disputed
compensatory damages. At an unsuccessful pre-trial settlement conference,
some of the judges learned that the plaintiff's lawyer demanded $10 million
on behalf of his client (the "High Anchor" condition), while other judges
learned only that the plaintiff wanted a lot of money (the "No Anchor"
condition). The researchers asked the judges in both conditions to indicate
the amount of compensatory damages they would award. Consistent with the
research on mock jurors, Wistrich and his collaborators found that the anchor
had a significant impact on the judges. In the No Anchor condition, judges
awarded a mean amount of $808,000 and a median amount of $700,000; in
the High Anchor condition, judges awarded a much larger mean amount of
47 Id. at 359. Note also that the researchers included a control condition with no cap
on the punitive damages. In that condition, the mock jurors awarded $5,431,724 in
compensatory damages and $5,038,833 in punitive damages. Id.
48 Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 1251, 1286-91 (2005). For another anchoring study involving judges, see Chris
Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 777, 787-92 (2001).
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$2,210,000 and median amount of $1 million.49 Given that the information
discussed in settlement conferences-like the plaintiffs lawyer's damage
request in this vignette-is inadmissible at trial and is therefore inappropriate
for the judges to consider, this result is particularly striking.50
Researchers have also found that anchoring can influence outcomes in
criminal cases. In one study, Birte Englich and Thomas Mussweiler presented
German criminal trial judges with a lengthy vignette describing a criminal
case involving an alleged rape.5 1 They assigned the participating judges to
one of two conditions. In one condition, the judges learn that the prosecutor
had demanded a two-month prison term for the defendant; in the other, the
prosecutor had demanded a sentence of 34 months. The judges in the former
group sentenced the defendant to less than 19 months in jail, while the judges
in the latter group sentenced the defendant to nearly 30 months in jail.52
When exposed to the high anchor, judges increased their average sentence by
roughly 50 percent.
This research suggests not only that jurors and judges are influenced by
anchoring in civil cases but also that "judges use the sentencing demand as
an anchor in making their sentencing decisions" 53 in criminal cases. In short,
anchoring appears to influence outcomes in the courtroom.
B. Anchoring at the Bargaining Table
Anchoring can be pernicious in court. There, the state empowers juries
and judges to impose binding decisions on litigants. If anchoring has an
untoward impact on the jury's or judge's decisionmaking, the losing party
must bear the brunt of that decision, perhaps paying an inappropriate amount
in damages or serving an inappropriately long sentence in jail.
49 Wistrich, Guthrie & Rachlinksi, supra note 48, at 1290. The researchers also
conducted a "no anchor" versus a "low anchor" experiment with the judges and found a
statistically significant difference between the responses of the two groups. Id. That is,
the low anchor depressed the judges' damage awards.
50 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408.
51 Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring
Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1538-41 (2001).
52 Id. at 1540.
53 Id. at 1541. Of course, a prosecutor's demands are obviously relevant to a judge's
sentencing decisions. In another study, though, Englich and Mussweiler found similar
anchoring effects, even where they attributed the sentencing recommendation not to a
prosecutor but to a computer science student. Id. at 1542-46.
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In negotiation, by contrast, the state is largely absent, 54 and the parties
generate their own outcomes. Although this suggests that there should be less
concern about anchoring at the bargaining table, it may be even more
insidious there than in the courtroom because negotiation is so much more
common than adjudication. Many more disputes are resolved through
negotiation-roughly two-thirds of all court cases-than through motions or
trial.55 Deals such as buying and selling goods and services, entering into real
property transactions, merging and acquiring companies, and so forth are
also negotiated on an almost constant basis. Thus, anchoring at the
bargaining table may lead to much more inefficiency and inequity than
anchoring in the courtroom.
Several studies have found evidence that anchors of various kinds-
including opening offers/demands, statutory damage caps, insurance policy
limits, negotiator aspirations, and so forth-can have an effect on both
settlements and deals. 56 In one typical bargaining experiment, for example,
William Bottom and Paul Paese assigned MBA students to play the role of a
buyer or a seller in a negotiation over the sale of a used truck. 57 The
researchers assigned the buyers to one of three conditions; in each, the
researchers gave the buyers a "tip" about the seller's best available
alternative. Each tip included a different anchor; the researchers informed the
buyers that the seller could sell the truck to another prospective purchaser for
$15,000, $17,500, or $20,000.58 All of the participants reached agreement in
the subsequent negotiation, but the anchors exerted a significant influence on
the purchase price. Buyers paid $18,110 for the used truck in the $15,000
anchor condition; $18,742 in the $17,500 anchor condition; and $19,733 in
the $20,000 anchor condition. 59
In a study of settlement negotiations, Jeffrey Rachlinski and Chris
Guthrie gave insurance industry professionals a vignette involving a dispute
54 We say "largely" absent because the state occasionally participates in negotiation.
For example, many disputes settle due to the participation of a judge in a judicial
settlement conference. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1340 (1994). And in
some instances-for example, class action settlements-judges must approve the deals
that parties have entered into with one another. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e).
55 Galanter & Cahill, supra note 54, at 1340.
56 See supra notes 6-9.
57 William P. Bottom & Paul W. Paese, Judgment Accuracy and the Asymmetric
Cost of Errors in Distributive Bargaining, 8 GROUP DECISION & NEGOT. 349, 358-62
(1999).
58 Id. at 358.
59 Id. at 360.
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over an automobile accident. 6° They randomly assigned the participants to
one of two groups, each of which received the same information about the
case except for the liability insurance policy limit. One group learned the
policy cap was $150,000 and the other learned the cap was $500,000. The
participants read the following:
Suppose you are advising an insurance company client on a claim. The
insurer has asked you for a settlement recommendation in the following
case:
The insurer sold an auto insurance policy to a small package-delivery
'company. The policy provided a [$150,000/$500,000] limit on liability for
each driver. Unfortunately, one of the drivers, named Dale, was recently
involved in an automobile accident involving a 25-year-old graduate student
named Perry. Dale's truck sideswiped Perry's car on a wet, spring morning.
As a result of the accident, Perry broke three ribs and his right arm. He
spent two days in the hospital and missed three weeks of classes.
Fortunately, he has fully recovered from his physical injuries. However, he
claims to be suffering from recurring nightmares, 'day sweats,' and other
'episodes of anxiety' as a result of the accident.
The parties have stipulated that the accident was caused solely by Dale's
negligent driving. Thus, the only issue in the lawsuit is the amount of
damages the insurer should pay pursuant to the liability policy. Trial is
imminent.61
The researchers asked the participants whether they would recommend
that "the insurer pay the full policy limit to settle the case." 62 None of them
recommended settlement for the full policy limit. The researchers then asked
them to identify "the maximum amount" they would recommend the insurer
pay to settle.63 Even though none of the respondents agreed to pay the full
policy amount, the policy limit still had a significant impact on their
recommendations. Those who learned the policy limit was $150,000
indicated that they would recommend a mean settlement offer of $51,111 and
a median settlement offer of $50,000. Those who learned the policy limit was
60 Rachlinski & Guthrie, supra note 7.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
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$500,000 indicated that they would recommend significantly more, $79,352
on average and a median award of $60,000.64
In another settlement study, Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie took a
slightly different approach.65 They presented student-subjects with a
hypothetical dispute over a defective automobile and asked the subjects to
respond to a final settlement offer from the defendant-seller in the amount of
$12,000. For some of the subjects, the final offer followed an opening offer
of $2,000; for other subjects, the final offer followed an opening offer of
$10,000. The researchers found that subjects in the former group were more
likely to settle than those in the latter group.66 They explained that those
subjects who received the $2,000 settlement offer from the defendant
expected to settle for a relatively small amount, so the $12,000 final
settlement offer seemed generous by comparison. By contrast, those who
received the $10,000 opening offer expected to settle for relatively.more, so
the $12,000 final offer seemed relatively stingy. The opening offers
effectively "anchored subjects' expectations" and influenced their settlement
preferences. 67
These and other individual studies suggest that anchoring can affect
negotiation. Opening offers, policy limits, damage caps, and other starting
figures appear to influence outcomes at the bargaining table. Of course, any
individual study has its limitations. Such studies often have small sample
sizes, involve only novice negotiators, and use simplistic fact patterns. Meta-
analysis can help us overcome some of these methodological and interpretive
difficulties.
IV. ANCHORING META-ANALYSIS: METHODS AND RESULTS
Meta-analysis is a method of cumulating the results of individual studies
to arrive at an overall result that is more accurate and credible than those
obtained from any of the individual studies alone.68 By aggregating the
results of individual studies into a much larger sample with greater statistical
power, meta-analysis minimizes bias or error that might be present in an
individual study and generates a cumulative result that provides a more
64 Id. In this article, Rachlinski and Guthrie report the results of another anchoring
study involving insurers and found that anchoring did not have a statistically significant
impact on their proposed settlement amounts. Id.
65 Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 6, at 11-13.
66 Id. at 13.
67 Id. at 19.
68 R. Rosenthal & M. R. DiMatteo, Meta-Analysis: Recent Developments in
Quantitative Methods for Literature Reviews, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 59, 61 (2001).
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conclusive answer to the research question posed. As Gregory Mitchell puts
it, "A single meta-analytic study, using systematic techniques for the
estimation of effect sizes and effect parameters over collections of studies,
may provide more useful information for policymaking purposes than
hundreds of individual studies." 69
Legal scholars routinely cite meta-analyses to support empirical claims
they want to make about the legal world,70 but few law reviews have actually
published original meta-analyses. This is unfortunate because meta-analysis
can provide "the basic facts needed to draw both practical and explanatory
conclusions," and has accordingly become critical to the formulation of
sound public policy. 71
A. Conducting a Meta-Analysis
There is more than one way to conduct a meta-analysis. 72 The two
dominant approaches are those developed by John Hunter, Frank Schmidt,
and Gregg Jackson73 and those developed by Mark Lipsey and David
Wilson.74 Following either approach, the initial procedure is the same.
69 Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies Versus Boundaries: Levels of Generality in
Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781, 1792-93 (2003).
70 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2513 nn.207-08 (2004) ('These studies reveal that the framing of
the question matters immensely."); Ramit Mizrahi, Hostility to the Presence of Women:
Why Women Undermine Each Other in the Workplace and the Consequences for Title IX,
113 YALE L.J. 1579, 1595 n.83 (2004) (stating men are judged inherently better at jobs
perceived as masculine, regardless of performance by female equals); Dan Simon, A
Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. Cfi.
L. REV. 511, 518 (2004) (explaining effects of involvement on attitude change);
Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 49 n.215
(2003) ("People with serious mental disorders are no more likely to recidivate than other
offenders."); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 652 n.169
(2004) (describing influence of a judge's ideology on decisionmaking).
71 John E. Hunter & Frank L. Schmidt, Cumulative Research Knowledge and Social
Policy Formulation: The Critical Role of Meta-Analysis, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
324, 324-25 (1996).
72 Rosenthal & DiMatteo, supra note 68, at 68 (citing Judith Hall & Robert
Rosenthal, Interpreting and Evaluating Meta-Analysis, 18 EVALUATION & HEALTH PROF.
393, 393-407 (1995)).
73 See, e.g., JOHN E. HUNTER, FRANK L. SCHMIDT & GREGG B. JACKSON, META-
ANALYSIS: CUMULATING RESEARCH FINDINGS ACROSS STUDIES (1982); JOHN E. HUNTER
& FRANK L. SCHMIDT, METHODS OF META-ANALYSIS: CORRECTING ERROR AND BIAS IN
RESEARCH FINDINGS (1990).
74 See generally MARK W. LIPSEY & DAVID B. WILSON, Practical Meta-Analysis, in
49 APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS SERIES (2001).
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Researchers begin by identifying the relevant individual studies. From these,
they collect the reported statistical outcomes or "effect sizes." Because
individual studies often use different statistical measures of the effect size,
the researchers convert them into a common statistical metric. 75 This metric
is then used to perform a meta-analysis that weights the studies according to
sample size, statistical significance, and similar factors. What results is a
kind of weighted average effect size that summarizes the relationship
between or among the variables in the analysis, supported by the weight and
power of the meta-sample.
The Hunter, Schmidt, and Jackson method and the Lipsey and Wilson
method differ primarily in the statistical metric each uses. The founer
generally uses a basic measure of correlation known as Pearson's r, while
the latter uses a measure called the "standardized mean effect size," which is
employed primarily in meta-analysis. Pearson's r is the simplest and most
commonly used measure of correlation. Using Pearson's r provides a
number of methodological advantages, the most important of which is
parsimony of information. 76 Writing in the Annual Review of Psychology,
Robert Rosenthal and M. Robin DiMatteo observe, "[t]he simpler a meta-
analysis, the more likely it is to be accurate; it is not possible to present one
that is too simple."77 Mindful of this advice, we use the most straightforward
metric-Pearson's r--employed by the Hunter, Schmidt, and Jackson
approach to meta-analysis. 78
1. Locating Studies
To locate relevant studies, we conducted searches in the computer
databases Psyclnfo, JSTOR, Web of Science, Ingenta, ProQuest, and
75 Proponents of the Lipsey & Wilson method have developed a powerful battery of
techniques to convert effect sizes. These techniques are useful regardless of the final
metric chosen for the meta-analysis. Id. at 59-61.
76 See Rosenthal & DiMatteo, supra note 68, at 71 (discussing at length the
advantages of r).
77 Id. at 68.
78 Use of Pearson's r in meta-analysis does have one drawback. In circumstances
where it is used to report a relationship between categorical variables-i.e., variables that
are not on a continuous scale-the use of r will tend to understate the magnitude of the
effect that the independent variable has on the dependent variable. See Lipsey & Wilson,
supra note 74, at 59-61 (discussing problems arising in meta-analyses of r derived from
correlations between dichotomous (category) variables). In the meta-analysis we report
below, however, we explore the relationship between two scale variables, i.e., a
numerical opening offer and a numerical negotiated agreement. Accordingly, the use of
Pearson's r will not lead to an understatement of the effect size. Id.
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Westlaw by pairing the term "negotiation" with anchoring terms (e.g.,
"anchoring", "adjustment", "first-offer", and "heuristic"). We also examined
reference lists-i.e., bibliographies and footnotes-in a number of
negotiation texts and articles as well as in the studies we identified. Finally,
we attempted to find unpublished research, both by conducting Internet
searches and by talking with selected authors who have published papers
relevant to anchoring or negotiation. 79
2. Criteria for Inclusion in the Meta-Analysis
The touchstone for inclusion in this meta-analysis is whether a study
reports a relationship between an anchor and a negotiated outcome in a
simulated negotiation. Many of the anchoring studies rely on surveys that ask
subjects to respond to negotiation hypotheticals.80 Although this research is
both useful and relevant, we focused our analysis on anchoring effects
observed in simulated negotiations and, therefore, excluded those studies
reporting survey results only.8' In nearly all of the studies in our meta-
analysis, participants conducted live, face-to-face negotiations; in two
instances, however, the negotiation occurred through the repeated exchange
of written offers.82
Once we identified the appropriate studies, we collected each study's
reported effect size, as summarized in Table 3 and the accompanying notes. 83
79 We completed our literature search in the spring of 2004, so our meta-analysis
does not include studies published since then. See, e.g., Adam D. Galinsky, Geoffrey J.
Leonardelli, Gerardo A. Okhuysen & Thomas Mussweiler, Regulatory Focus at the
Bargaining Table: Promoting Distributive and Integrative Success, 8 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1087 (2005).
80 See, e.g., Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 6, at 6.
81 In those cases where authors used both methods, we excluded the survey results
but included the simulated negotiation results. See, e.g., Bottom & Paese, supra note 57,
at 353.
82 These studies are: Thomas S. Bateman, Contingent Concession Strategies in
Dyadic Bargaining, 26 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 212, 214
(1980); Robert M. Liebert, William P. Smith, J. H. Hill & Miriam Keiffer, The Effects of
Information and Magnitude of Initial Offer on Interpersonal Negotiation, 4 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 431, 434-35 (1968).
83 In some studies, the researchers reported multiple effect sizes, demonstrating
relationships between several different anchors and the outcome of a negotiation. As a
consequence, we made some judgments about which effect sizes to include in our
analysis. In one study, for instance, researchers asked subjects to negotiate the same
problem with multiple negotiation partners. See Galinsky & Mussweiler, supra note 6, at
662-63. We included these in our meta-analysis as separate effect sizes. See Table 3,
supra.
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Table 3-Summary of Included Studies
In three other studies, researchers reported effect sizes in situations where they
exposed participants assigned to experimental groups to different experimental
treatments. In those cases where the differences among these groups were irrelevant to
our own research goals, we calculated a weighted average effect size, which we report in
Table 3. See Lipsey & Wilson, supra note 74, at 112-13 (recommending weighted
averaging of multiple effect sizes from the same sample). We did this to prevent the
experimental treatment given to these groups from influencing our own results. See
Bottom & Paese, supra note 57, at 358-60 (Study 2, assuming equal distribution among
optimistic, pessimistic, and accurate anchor groups); Liebert et al., supra note 82, at 435-
38 (average of counteroffer and non-counteroffer conditions).
In one study, however, researchers tested the hypothesis that information can reduce
the effects of anchoring. See generally Galinsky & Mussweiler, supra note 6. In this
study, the researchers provided the experimental groups-but not the control group-
with additional information regarding their opponents' positions. Because the differences
among these groups are relevant to our hypothesis that information mitigates anchoring,
we included the results from the control group subjects in our primary meta-analysis and
the results from the experimental group subjects in our secondary meta-analysis testing
the mitigating impact of information.
84 This assumes equal distribution among the optimistic, pessimistic, and accurate
anchor groups.
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85 Mean of the high and low anchor groups converted to R from Cohen's D.
86 Average of counteroffer and no-counteroffer conditions.
87 Reported effect is for initiators since they presented the first offer in the
negotiation.
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Citation Subjects Negotiation Anchor Outcome N R
Van Poucke Purchase of a Buyer's
& Buelens Unspecified water plant opening Sale price 183 0.6388
(2002) offer
Yukl (1974) College Sale of a car Opponent' Sale price 60 0.52
students offer
3. Coding
We were also interested in the mitigating effect two variables might lave
on anchoring. Specifically, we hypothesized that negotiators operating in an
information-rich environment would be less likely to be influenced by an
anchor than those operating in an environment with limited information.
Additionally, we hypothesized that anchoring might exert less influence on
experienced negotiators than on novices, despite research demonstrating that
both experts and novices are susceptible to anchoring. 89 Thus, we further
coded the studies according to the amount and kind of information available
to the recipient of the anchor and according to the experience of the
negotiator. We used these coded results to conduct two secondary meta-
analyses.
To code for information, we created three categories-low, moderate,
and high-information--depicted in Table 4. What separates the categories
from one another is the amount of information provided to the negotiator
who received the anchor. The low-information category included studies
where only limited information was provided. The moderate-information
category included studies in which the negotiators received a second,
relevant anchor, such as the "best alternative to a negotiated agreement" or
BATNA.90 (We made one exception to this coding rule where the
experimenters deliberately supplied ambiguous and non-salient BATNAs to
88 Reported effect was not averaged with seller's opening offer because buyer's
offer was always first in the negotiation.
89 See, e.g., Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 48, at 784-87 (discussing
judges); Northcraft & Neale, supra note 21 (discussing realtors); Wistrich, Guthrie &
Rachlinski, supra note 48 (discussing whether judges can ignore inadmissible
information).
9 0 See ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATrON, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 99-106 (2d ed. 1991) (defining
BATNA).
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the participants in the study.91) Finally, the high-information category
included studies where the negotiator received not only an independent
anchor or BATNA relevant to her own position, but similar information
about her opponent's position. This information could be knowledge of her
opponent's costs, reservation price, aspiration price, BATNA, or, in one case,
an inside "scoop" that the opponent was under unique time pressure to reach
agreement. 92
Table 4-Information Conditions
Citation Information provided Info. TN TR
Bateman (1980) Basic briefing materials L 24 0.67
Blount, Thomas-Hunt &
Neal (1996) Reservation price M 107 0.56
Bottom & Paese (1999) Reservation price and M 29 0.78BATNA
Brodt (1994) "Scoop" of seller's time H 16 0.3093pressures
Chertkoff & Conley (1967) Reservation price and M 240 0.42BATNA
Claussen-Schulz (2003) Independent appraisal price M 17 0.56
Diekman, et. al. (1996) Sunk costs and opponent's H 26 0.32
costs
91 We made this exception because the purpose of the ambiguous BATNA was to
provide the negotiators with less clear information to base their positions on rather than
more. See Dirk Van Poucke & Marc Buelens, Predicting the Outcome of a Two-party
Price Negotiation: Contribution of Reservation Price, Aspiration Price, and Opening
Offer, 23 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 67, 72 (2002) ("The buyer's BATNA remained vague: it
remained unclear whether or not building a new plant was a viable option. We made the
seller's BATNA also vague .... ).
92 Susan E. Brodt, "Inside Information" and Negotiator Decision Behavior, 58
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HuM. DECISION PROCESsES 172, 184 (1994).
93 Treatment group when buyers knew the inside scoop but sellers made the opening
bid. This approximates our hypothesis that the presence of alternate information reduces
the impact of an anchor.
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Citatidn Information provided Info. TN TR
Fobian & Christensen- Chance of winning BATNA M 32 0.43
Szalanski (1994)
Galinsky & Mussweiler
(2001), x.l: Opponent's BATNA H 19 0.30
Opponent's reservation H 16 0.4095
x.2: price
x.3: Own reservation price M 20 0.34
Holmes, Throop & Aspiration price M 24 0.43
Strickland (1971)
Kristensen & Garling BATNA and reservation M 36 0.33
(1997) price
Liebert, et. al. (1968) Opponent's costs H 40 0.48
Mussweiler, Strack & Opponent's BATNA and H 60 0.39
Pfeiffer (2000) counterarguments
Ritov (1996) None L 268 0.45
Van Poucke & Buelens BATNA L 183 0.63
(2002)
Yukl (1974) Suggested opening offer L 60 0.52
We also coded studies based on the experience level of the negotiators.
The effect sizes included in this subsample are summarized in Table 5. For
this subsample, we used two categories: novice and expert.96 We coded those
94 BATNA of negotiator who made the first offer was known by the offeror's
opponent.
95 Reservation price of negotiator who made the first offer was known by the
offeror's opponent.
96 Initially, we used a three-category coding scheme: novice, intermediate, and
expert. The novice category included participants with no prior professional negotiation
experience. The intermediate category included law and MBA students enrolled in a
negotiation course. The expert category was defined as above according to prior
professional negotiation experience or relevant professional experience. However, we
found that the intermediate category was indistinguishable from the novice category.
Accordingly, we decided to use a two-category coding system.
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participants with no prior negotiation experience related to the subject matter
of the negotiation as novices. The expert category included subjects with
prior professional negotiation experience, such as experts in auto
negotiations 97 or mid-level managers.98
Table 5-Experience Conditions
Citation Experience of Negotiators Exp. SN SR
Bateman (1980) None N 24 0.67
Blount, Thomas-Hunt & Neal MBA students in a negotiation N 107 0.56
(1996) class
Bottom & Paese (1999) Mid-level managers in executive E 29 0.78
education
Brodt (1994) None N 58 0.30
Chertkoff & Conley (1967) None N 240 0.42
Claussen-Schulz (2003) Law/MBA students in a N 17 0.56
negotiation class
Diekman, et. a]. (1996) MBA students in a negotiation N 26 0.32
class
Fobian & Christensen-Szalanski None N 32 0.43
(1994)
Galinsky & Mussweiler (2001), MBA students in a negotiation N 19 0.30
x. 1: class
MBA students in a negotiation N 16 0.40
x.2: class
MBA students in a negotiation N 20 0.34
x.3: classN 20 .3
97 Thomas Mussweiler, Fritz Strack & Tim Pfeiffer, Overcoming the Inevitable
Anchoring Effect: Considering the Opposite Compensates for Selective Accessibility, 26
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 1142, 1145 (2000).
98 Brodt, supra note 92, at 182.
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Citation Experience of Negotiators Exp. SN SR
Holmes, Throop & Strickland None N 24 0.43
(1971)
Kristensen & Garling (1997) None N 36 0.33
Liebert, et. al. (1968) None N 40 0.48
Mussweiler, Strack & Pfeiffer Car mechanics and dealers E 60 0.39
(2000)
Ritov (1996) None N 268 0.45
Van Poucke & Buelens (2002) None N 183 0.63
Yukl (1974) None N 60 0.52
B. Meta-Analysis Results
Our meta-analysis demonstrates that anchoring has a powerful influence
on negotiation outcomes. Across the studies in our sample, we find a
correlation of 0.497 between the initial anchor and the outcome of the
negotiation. At first blush, this result may be unsurprising; after all, none of
the 16 articles and 19 outcomes included in our meta-analysis reported an
effect size lower than 0.30. However, by the standards commonly applied in
the social and behavioral sciences, our finding is striking because it is
unusually "large." 99
In lay terms, the 0.497 correlation means that every one dollar increase in
an opening offer is associated with an approximate fifty-cent increase in the
final sale price.100 A simple conversion provides another estimate of the
impact anchoring can have on a negotiation. The square of a correlation
provides an estimate of the amount of variance that it explains. 10 1 The r-
squared value of the correlation in our study is 0.247. In general terms, this
99 Lipsey & Wilson, supra note 74, at 147 (citing JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL
POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1988)).
100 Although a correlation by itself does not denote causality, the fact that the anchor
precedes the outcome in time creates an inference of causality. Still, there are likely other
factors that influence both the anchor and the outcome. Not the least of these is the desire
of both parties to reach an agreement.
101 THOMAS H. WONNACOTT & RONALD J. WONNACOTI, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS
486-87 (5th ed. 1990).
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means that nearly 25 percent of the difference in outcomes among
negotiations can be accounted for as a function of an opening offer or other
initial anchor. (This finding is consistent with other research showing that an
opening offer and initial counteroffer account for 57.6 percent of the variance
in negotiated outcomes. 10 2)
Meta-analyses, including this one, are generally based on published
studies. Studies are more likely to be published if they report significant
effects than if they do not. Thus, critics argue that meta-analyses are biased
toward finding effects because they merely reflect these underlying studies.
This is the so-called "publication bias" or "file drawer problem."' 10 3
_., Researchers use two techniques to address this potential problem with
meta-analysis. The first is to ensure that a meta-analysis includes relevant
unpublished studies. Unpublished studies can be located through methods
such as conversations with researchers in the relevant field and Internet
searches. We attempted to locate unpublished studies to include in our meta-
analysis, but we were able to identify only one.104
The second technique is to conduct a "file drawer" test,105 which
assesses the significance of the meta-analysis relative to a hypothetical file
drawer of unpublished studies. More specifically, it tells us how many
studies reporting no effect (i.e., how many studies showing no statistically
significant relationship) would have to be in such a file drawer to render the
results of the meta-analysis statistically insignificant. We performed a file-
drawer test, and we found that it would take 113 studies to negate the finding
that an initial anchor influences the negotiated outcome. While any anchoring
study reporting an effect size lower than 0.497 would reduce the magnitude
of our reported effect, researchers would need to conduct 113 studies
reporting no anchoring effect to produce a meta-analysis showing no effect.
1. Information
Although anchoring exerts a powerful influence in negotiation, our
results suggest that this influence is somewhat diminished by the presence of
additional information and negotiator experience. In contrast to our overall
102 Van Poucke & Buelens, supra note 91, at 70 ("Both opening offers together
explain 57.6 percent of the variance.").
103 Robert Rosenthal, Writing Meta-Analytic Reviews, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 183,
189 (1995).
104 See Aletha Claussen-Schulz, As Good As Your Word: The Effect of Expressed
Commitment and First Offers on Outcomes in a Negotiation Simulation, (Kellogg
Graduate Sch. of Mgmt. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 209, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=400800.
105 Rosenthal, supra note 103, at 189.
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correlation of 0.497, we found that the correlation in the high-information
category, when negotiators received some relevant knowledge regarding their
opponent's position, fell to 0.38. Conversely, in the low information
category, where the initial anchor was the only salient price, the initial
anchor carried greater weight, rising to 0.54. Moderate-information
negotiations showed a slightly, but not significantly, lower anchoring effect
of 0.47 relative to the overall effect of 0.497.106
2. Experience
Similarly, our results suggest that anchoring effects are somewhat less
pronounced among experienced negotiators. As compared to the overall
correlation of .497, we found a 0.37 correlation between the anchor and the
negotiation outcome where the negotiators had relevant professional
experience. This finding suggests that an experienced negotiator is still likely
to be influenced by an anchor, but somewhat less so than a novice. 107
106 Not surprisingly, we found no meaningful difference between our overall
correlation (0.497) and the correlation in our moderate-information category (0.47). The
standard error surrounding the medium information correlation is 0.04. Further, we note
that the confidence intervals surrounding correlations for the information categories
overlap (see below). The overlap is likely the result of two factors: first, the small number
of studies in the high information category and second, it is likely that information could
be more accurately measured not as a category variable but as a scale variable based on
the number of additional salient anchors and whether the anchors were personal or
provided information about the opponent.
GrouR Point Est. Std. Error Lower Limit Upper Limit Z P
High 0.38 0.07 0.25 0.50 5.34 0.00
Moderate 0.47 0.04 0.40 0.54 11.24 0.00
Low 0.54 0.04 0.48 0.60 14.18 0.00
Combined 0.49 0.02 0.45 0.53 18.70 0.00
107 There were relatively few studies that included experienced negotiators. Because
all other studies were coded into the novice category, the mean effect size in this category
cannot be distinguished from the effect size in the overall sample. (0.51 among novices as
compared to 0.49 overall). Overlap in the confidence intervals between the experienced
and combined effects similarly suggests experience is also a scale rather than a category
variable. See id.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR NEGOTIATORS
Our meta-analysis demonstrates that anchoring has a powerful impact on
negotiation, though this impact appears to be somewhat muted in
information-rich environments and among expert negotiators. These results
have important implications for negotiators, both "offensively" and
"defensively."
A. Playing Offense
. Negotiators who are aware of anchoring can-and should-use this
information to their advantage in at least two ways. First, negotiators can
harness the power of anchoring by setting high goals for themselves prior to
the negotiation. Second, negotiators can capitalize on anchoring by opening
with high demands (or low offers) when they are at the bargaining table.
Prior to a negotiation, negotiators should prepare by focusing on their
goals (without neglecting their interests, their counterpart's interests, options,
BATNAs, etc.108). Negotiators who set high and measurable goals for
themselves consistently outperform those who set more modest goals for
themselves, in part because a high goal can serve to anchor the negotiator's
expectations about the outcome. 10 9 Psychologist Leigh Thompson explains
that, "[N]egotiators who set high aspirations end up with more of the pie than
those who set lower aspirations. And, negotiators whose aspirations exceed
those of their opponents get more of the bargaining zone."1 10
Once at the bargaining table, negotiators will generally fare better if they
open with high demands (or low offers). Many scholars advise negotiators to
open with the most self-serving position they can reasonably justify."l '
108 See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & DANNY ERTEL, GETTING READY TO NEGOTIATE: THE
GETTING TO YES WORKBOOK 3 (1995) (proposing a negotiation planning approach
consistent with principled or problem-solving negotiation).
109 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 9, at 38-44; Sally Blount White & Margaret A.
Neale, The Role of Negotiator Aspirations and Settlement Expectancies in Bargaining
Outcomes, 57 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 303, 309-11
(1994).
10 LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 47 (3d ed.
2005); see also G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION
STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 26-27 (1999) (arguing that negotiators should
convert their "goals" into "expectations" and explaining why this can lead to better
negotiation outcomes).
111 See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING
RATIONALLY 29 (1992) ("To use anchoring to your advantage, you must decide what
initial offer will attract the attention of the other party. It can't be so extreme that the
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Richard Shell, for example, advises negotiators to open with "the highest (or
lowest) number for which there is a supporting standard or argument
enabling you to make a presentable case."1 12 We agree with this advice, but
it is worth observing that the research on anchoring suggests that negotiators
might benefit from starting with even more self-serving positions, even
positions that they cannot possibly justify. This seems particularly true when
the opposing negotiator is relatively inexperienced in the kind of negotiation
at hand and when the offeror expects the recipient of the offer to possess
relatively little information about the value of the item being negotiated.
B. Playing Defense
It is a truism in sports that "defense wins championships." Likewise, in
negotiation, defense may be more important than offense. Negotiators aware
of the research on anchoring can-and should-take steps to defend against
its pernicious effects. Unfortunately, however, awareness alone is not
enough; anchoring persists even when we are aware of its effects. 13 Greater
attention, effort, and concentration also appear to be insufficient to defeat
anchoring."l 4 Rather, negotiators need to adopt "de-biasing" strategies to
avoid, or at least minimize, the effects of anchoring. 115
Negotiators should adopt both "inside" and "outside" de-biasing
strategies. 116 Inside strategies are those within the negotiator's mind. An
inside strategy, in other words, is "a voluntary reasoning process designed to
improve the accuracy of judgment by creating a fertile corrective
environment in the mind."' 1 7 Researchers have developed a handful of inside
strategies, the most successful of which appears to be the so-called "consider
opponent won't even consider it. You want your offer to be attractive enough to your
opponent to serve as an anchor for subsequent offers.").
112 SHELL, supra note 110, at 161.
113 See, e.g., Chapman & Johnson, supra note 30, at 125 ("Making participants
aware of the anchor's effect does not decrease anchoring.").
114 See J.D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAW & PHIL. 393, 420
(2005) (observing that "general admonitions to concentrate or attend to the evidence do
not improve people's performance").
115 See, e.g., Baruch Fischoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra
note 11, at 422.
116 Philosopher J.D. Trout proposes this dichotomy. See Trout, supra note 114. This
work builds on observations by Dan Kahneman and Dan Lovallo. See Daniel Kahneman
& Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk
Taking, 39 MGMT. Se. 17, 24-27 (1993) (describing "inside" and "outside" perspectives
on forecasting problems).
117 See Trout, supra note 114, at 418.
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the opposite" strategy. 118 Developed to de-bias overconfidence and the
hindsight bias, this strategy calls for the negotiator to consider the opposite
perspective before deciding whether to accept an offer. In other words, the
negotiator should "stop to consider why [his or her] judgment might be
wrong" in this instance. 119 If the negotiator generates reasons not to reach
agreement on the basis of the terms proposed by his counterpart, the
negotiator may be able to resist the effects of anchoring. 120 Unfortunately,
however, as J.D. Trout observes, inside de-biasing strategies like the
consider-the-opposite strategy provide only limited protection. 121
Outside de-biasing strategies offer more promise. These strategies
change the problem dynamic entirely. "An outside strategy," in other words,
"identifies features of the environment whose presence can be manipulated to
produce the most accurate or desirable available outcome." 122 Trout offers
the following illustration:
This outside, 'policy' approach improves decision-making by changing the
dimensions of the choice-set. A good example of an outside strategy is the
prevention of 'independent' auditors from working with a bank or
brokerage firm for more than, say, five consecutive years. Rather than
simply advising auditors to be impartial, or expecting them to be
professional and direct in delivering bad news to the company responsible
for their employer's financial growth, the outside strategy removes the
threat to integrity by eliminating its source. 123
As noted above, we found evidence that information and expertise can
mitigate the effects of an anchor. Relying on our findings, we recommend
two outside de-biasing strategies, one of which focuses on information and
the other of which focuses on experts. First, we recommend that negotiators
strive to adopt an "outside" view, rather than an "inside" view, of the
negotiation. An "inside" view "focus[es] on the case at hand," while an
outside view "essentially ignores the details of the case at hand" and "focuses
on the statistics of a class of cases chosen to be similar in relevant respects to
the present one." 124 When negotiating a car purchase, for example,
118 See Charles G. Lord, Mark R. Lepper & Elizabeth Preston, Considering the
Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1231, 1231 (1984).
119 PLous, supra note 1, at 228.
120 See, e.g., Trout, supra note 114, at 420.
121 Id. at 418-20.
122 Id. at 420 (emphasis in original).
123 Id. at 421.
124 Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 116, at 25.
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negotiators should rely on statistical data available in such publications as
Consumer Report or Kelley's Blue Book to help them determine an
appropriate deal point, rather than relying solely on the initial demand made
by the car dealer. Likewise, when negotiating a home purchase, a buyer
should gather publicly available data regarding the sales of comparable
homes and use that to help determine the price, rather than allowing the
seller's initial demand to set the price. Similarly, negotiators involved in
legal disputes should rely on settlement and verdict data from comparable
cases-available on Lexis, Westlaw, morelaw.com, etc.-rather than
allowing themselves to be unduly influenced by a demand or offer made by a
counterpart. In short, negotiators should focus not on deciding whether to
settle at or near terms proposed by an adversary but rather on gathering and
using information from comparable cases to help determine an appropriate
price. 125
In addition to adopting an outside view of the negotiation, we
recommend that those who need negotiation services hire expert negotiators,
namely lawyers. As reported above, experts are somewhat less susceptible to
the effects of anchoring, 126 and lawyers are the consummate expert
negotiators. 127 Moreover, lawyers appear to be more "rational" and analytical
than many other members of the population.128 This is not say that lawyers
are pure "rational actors" who are impervious to the effects of anchoring and
other heuristics and biases; in fact, lawyers, like others, are susceptible to
such biases. 129 However, a growing body of experimental evidence suggests
125 This prescription is similar to advice offered by Roger Fisher, William Ury, and
Bruce Patton to use "objective criteria" in negotiation. See FISHER, URY & PATRON, supra
note 90, at 56-80.
126 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, ScOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO,
BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 95 (2000)
(noting that "a lawyer may have comparative advantages simply because he is a better
negotiator than his client" and that "clients often hire lawyers for their negotiating skills
as well as for their knowledge or resources"); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin,
Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 509, 509-10 (1994) (observing that one key institutional feature of our
legal system is that clients use lawyers to resolve their disputes).
128 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, The Lawyer's Philosophical Map and the Disputant's
Perceptual Map: Impediments to Facilitative Mediation and Lawyering, 6 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REv. 145, 156-57 (2001).
129 See, e.g., Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs about Adjudicated Outcomes:
Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT'L. REv. L. & ECON. 289, 296-97
(1995) (finding that framing effects had a similar impact on lawyer and non-lawyer
subjects); Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy
Cases, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 982 (1994) (finding that bankruptcy judges and lawyers
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that lawyers may be better able than others to resist biases, 130 including
anchoring. 131 Finally, research suggests that those who feel "accountable" to
others are more likely to resist anchoring. 132 Lawyers are likely to feel
accountable to their clients; indeed, the rules governing professional conduct
require lawyers to be accountable to their clients. 133 This suggests that
lawyers are more likely to avoid anchoring than their clients (and, indeed,
that lawyers may be better able to avoid anchoring when negotiating on
behalf of clients than when negotiating on their own behalf).
Because anchoring persists in the face of awareness, attention, and effort,
it promises to be stubborn. The de-biasing strategies we recommend do not
offer negotiators a foolproof way to defend against anchoring, but we believe
that they increase the likelihood that negotiators will reach agreements that
reflect the merits rather than an anchor proposed by an adversary.
VI. CONCLUSION
The value of meta-analysis is that it allows us to aggregate results from
multiple, individual studies. Using meta-analysis, we have demonstrated that
anchoring can have a significant impact on negotiation outcomes. We have
also shown that it has a less pronounced-though still quite substantial-
impact in circumstances where the recipient of the anchor is an experienced
negotiator and where the recipient possesses a rich body of information
containing competing anchor points. Thus, negotiators should both use
anchoring to their advantage and adopt strategies to avoid being abused by
anchoring in negotiation.
are prone to egocentric bias); Craig R. Fox & Richard Birke, Forecasting Trial
Outcomes: Lawyers Assign Higher Probability to Possibilities That Are Described in
Greater Detail, 26 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 159, 167-69 (2002) (demonstrating
decisionmaking biases when assessing probabilities).
130 See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and
Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 137 (1997)
(reporting experimental evidence showing that lawyers appear to be less susceptible than
hypothetical litigants to several heuristics and biases); Rachlinski & Guthrie, supra note 7.
131 Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 130, at 103-07.
132 See Arie W. Kruglanski & Tallie Freund, The Freezing and Unfreezing of Lay-
Inferences: Effects on Impressional Primacy, Ethnic Stereotyping, and Numerical
Anchoring, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 448, 458-62 (1983) (finding that
anchoring effects were more pronounced among high school subjects when they expected
to be evaluated). See generally Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the
Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 270 (1999).
133 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2003) ("A lawyer shall
abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter" and "consult with the client as to
the means by which [the client's objectives] are to be pursued.").
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